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 1. Introduction 
 
In staple food importing countries, policies affecting the quantities and prices of those 
imports are always politically sensitive. This is especially true of developing 
countries, where staple foods normally account, on the consumption side, for a large 
share of consumers’ budgets, and on the production side, for a large share of total 
employment. In Indonesia, the staple food, rice, represents 7.2 per cent of average 
consumer expenditure.1 Its production employs 7.1 per cent of the total work force at 
the farm level alone. These points apply with particular force for the lowest income 
groups, for whom the average share of rice in total consumption and the dependence 
on rice production as a source of employment are both much greater than for the 
general population. For example, for that part of the workforce with only primary 
school education or less, the production of paddy (rice produced at the farm level) 
accounts for 18 per cent of total employment. 
Indonesia is a net importer of rice, though the magnitude of its imports varies 
from year to year depending on domestic production, international prices and the size 
of Indonesia’s stocks. Over the 4 years following the Asian financial crisis of 1997-
98 (1998 to 2001, inclusive) Indonesia’s rice imports were 9.1 per cent of its total 
consumption of rice and 18 per cent of the world’s total imports, making Indonesia 
the world’s largest importer. Thailand was the largest exporter, followed by Vietnam 
and the US.   
Prior to the 1997-98 crisis Indonesia’s rice imports were monopolized by a 
public agency, Bulog. Figure 1 shows that except for the periods of the 1973 
commodity price boom and the 1997-98 exchange rate crisis, the real price of rice in 
Indonesia has been relatively stable, but that its post-crisis level was above its level 
over the previous three decades, even though international rice prices have declined 
relative to other traded commodities. From this and from Figure 2 it is apparent that 
the effects of Bulog’s market interventions were to stabilize rice prices relative to 
                                                          
1 This expenditure share is based on Indonesia’s national accounts. The average expenditure share 
calculated from the national income and expenditure survey (Susenas) is considerably higher than this, 
but the difference arises not from a difference in estimated expenditure on rice, but a difference in total 
expenditures. It appears that Susenas understates expenditures on goods and services other than rice, 
especially non-food, leading to the impression that rice expenditures are more important than they are. 
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international prices at a level not significantly different from the trend level of world 
prices (Timmer 1996). With the exchange rate volatility of the crisis period, local 
currency prices of imported rice surged. Despite this, Indonesian domestic prices 
remained well below exchange rate adjusted world prices, for a brief period, but from 
about 2000 until late 2004 they stabilized at levels 40 to 50 per cent above import 
prices. 
The large difference between the domestic and import price arose from changes 
in rice import policy which followed the 1997-98 crisis. Bulog’s monopoly on rice 
imports was abolished in 1998, but this agency still accounted for around 75 per cent 
of total imports. From 2000 onwards, private imports were subject to a specific tariff 
(rather than an ad valorem tariff) of Rp. 430 per kg, which in mid 2002 was around 
25 per cent of the import price (c.i.f.). In addition, private sector rice imports were 
subject to “red lane” customs treatment, meaning stricter standards of customs 
inspection than other food items, and were also subject to special import licensing 
requirements. The tariff plus these non-tariff barriers apparently account for the 
increased difference between the border price of imported rice and domestic prices.  
In 2003 the Ministry of Agriculture proposed an increase in the tariff of 75 per 
cent – from Rp. 430 to 750 per kg. – raising the ad valorem equivalent tariff from 25 
per cent to about 45 per cent. The tariff increase was reportedly opposed by the 
Ministry of Finance, which has ultimate responsibility for all taxes. In early 2004 a 
ban on rice imports was introduced.2 The ban was said to be ‘seasonal’, but a year 
later it remained in place. Nevertheless, special exemptions and a certain amount of 
smuggling apparently still permitted some imports of rice to occur.  
A truly ‘seasonal’ ban – one implemented only during specific, pre-announced 
times of the year – would have little effect. Anticipating the ban, importers would 
stockpile imports during periods when the ban was not in place, hoping to benefit 
from higher prices during the ban season. Holding the international price constant, the 
effect would merely be to force importers or others to incur more storage costs than 
would otherwise be optimal; due to these costs, there would be a small price increase 
during the period of the ban, compared with the price that would otherwise obtain, 
but otherwise no effect. To be effective, a ban must be permanent, or at least 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
2 Since an import ban is not a tax, the Ministry of Finance does not have jurisdiction over it. 
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unanticipated. On the other hand, a seasonal ban is capable of insulating the domestic 
price from temporary fluctuations in the international price which might occur during 
the period of the ban and which would otherwise be transmitted to the domestic price. 
 
The argument for protection 
Arguments supporting restrictions and/or tariffs on rice imports have come in 
part from Bulog and the Ministry of Agriculture. First, it has been said that without 
protection Indonesia’s rice sector cannot achieve the goal of rice self-sufficiency – a 
strongly held objective of some of Indonesia’s political leaders despite its lack of any 
sound economic foundation. In its preoccupation with food self-sufficiency, 
Indonesia is not different from many other staple food importing countries, at least 
those which are also significant producers of these commodities.  
Second, protection has been said to be necessary because world rice prices are 
‘distorted’ by export subsidies in major exporting countries. This argument is 
seemingly no stronger than the first. If rice import prices were to be permanently 
depressed by exporter policies which amount to ‘dumping’, then no matter how 
‘distortionary’ these policies may be, Indonesia’s most rational policy would be to 
adjust to this feature of its international environment and reallocate resources 
accordingly, rather than to protect its domestic economy from the cheaper imports 
which the exporting countries now, so kindly, provide.  
Finally, and most controversially of all, protection has been said to be desirable 
because of its favorable income distributional effects. Compared with free trade, 
protection would supposedly reduce poverty by raising the incomes of poor farmers.3
 
The argument against protection  
Critics of protection for the rice industry have focused in particular on its 
distributional effects, arguing that an increase in the domestic price will actually 
increase poverty incidence. The analysis advanced most frequently distinguishes net 
producers and net consumers of rice and says that protection benefits the former at 
                                                          
3 Bulog has also claimed that protecting the rice industry is good for the environment, because it would 
keep irrigated land in rice production that might otherwise become idle. Few observers have agreed 
that the increased pesticide and fertilizer use that would follow, not to mention increased demand for 
irrigation water, could have environmental benefits. In any case, there seems little possibility that 
irrigated land not used for rice production would be left idle; it is too productive not to be used to 
produce other commodities. 
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the expense of the latter. The ‘net producers’ are sellers of rice, meaning farmers 
owning rice-producing land and renters of this land. The ‘net consumers’ are rural 
landless labourers, producers of agricultural commodities other than rice and virtually 
all urban residents, except for absentee owners of rice-producing land. This group 
also includes many farmers who produce some rice but who purchase additional rice 
with the proceeds of the sale of other commodities. It is pointed out that there are 
more poor people among the net consumers than the net producers. Protection of the 
rice industry would therefore raise poverty incidence rather than lowering it. 
Seemingly strong claims have been made about the degree to which poverty would 
decline if protection was reduced and, conversely, the degree to which poverty 
incidence would worsen if it was increased, as desired by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Bulog.4
One difficulty with the argument that protection of the rice industry would 
worsen income distribution is that most, but not all, of those arguing this case have 
focused on counting the numbers of poor people in each group, disregarding the 
potentially larger magnitude of the benefit received by each net producer from a price 
increase than the loss incurred by each net consumer. But this point is not necessarily 
decisive and there is a potentially more serious problem with the case that has been 
made against protection.  
According to the anti-protection argument, the beneficiaries from a price 
increase – net producers – include only land holders. Landless labourers employed in 
the rice sector, which includes vast numbers of poor people, are counted among the 
net consumers of rice – the losers from protection. These people derive their incomes 
not from the sale of rice but from the sale of their labour. It is implicitly assumed in 
the net producer / net consumer framework that a price increase would affect the 
living costs of these people, through the consumer price which they face, but not their 
incomes. This in turn assumes that the price increase would not raise the aggregate 
demand for unskilled labour. If it did, the increase in labour demand would produce 
some combination of increased employment and increased real wages for landless 
labourers. 
                                                          
4 Examples include a quantitative study by Ikhsan (2002) and the various Working Papers and Policy 
Briefs produced by the Indonesian Food Policy Program sponsored by USAID. These reports are 
available at www.macrofoodpolicy.com. 
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There is reason to think that these effects could be important. Suppose that rice 
producers respond to the increase in prices with an increase in output. The paddy 
(rice) industry is a large employer of unskilled labour. If it is also labour-intensive in 
its production technology, relative to the rest of the economy, in particular, intensive 
in its use of unskilled labour, then expansion of rice production would increase the 
demand for unskilled labour – the major asset of the poor – and presumably its price.5 
The argument that has been advanced against protection of the rice industry in 
Indonesia ignores any such effects.   
The nature of crop production is that supply response generally occurs only 
with some delay – say, six months to two years. The assumption of zero supply 
response, implying zero income effect for ‘net consumers’, may be roughly correct 
for the very short run – say periods of less than one year –  but not longer. So long as 
it remains in place, protection increases the domestic price permanently. How would 
Indonesian producers respond? It seems likely that the long run supply response in 
the Indonesian rice industry would be highly inelastic, but this does not mean that it 
would be zero. The notion that peasant farmers do not respond to price incentives, 
given sufficient time to adjust their production schedules, is one of the most 
thoroughly demolished myths in all of economics. 
 
Supply response of domestic rice producers 
Several empirical studies have looked at the issue of supply response in the 
Indonesian context, but their results vary. An early study by Mubyarto (1975) 
estimated the long run elasticity of planting area with respect to price on Java to be 
very low, at 0.03. Tabor (1988) estimated that in Java the elasticity of planting area 
with respect to price was 0.22 in wet land rice production and 0.45 in dry land 
production. A study by Hutauruk (1996) estimated the planting area response 
elasticity on Java to be 0.04 and off Java to be 0.78. Since the overall elasticity of 
supply includes the response of yield to price as well as the response of planted area, 
the implied output supply elasticities with respect to price will be larger than these 
estimates.6   
                                                          
5 Conversely, if the rice industry proved not to be labor-intensive, then this argument could run in the 
opposite direction, potentially strengthening the case against protection. 
6 The study by Mubyarto (1975) is cited in Irawan (1997) and the studies by Tabor (1998) and 
Hutauruk (1996) are cited in Irawan (2001). 
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A more recent study by Irawan (2001) estimates short and long term elasticities 
of supply response for several regions and for both wet and dry land rice production. 
The short term estimates for wet land rice are: Java 0.11, Sumatra 0.12, Sulawesi 0.45 
and Kalimantan 0.02. His long run estimates are: Java 0.13, Sumatra 0.52, Sulawesi 
1.25 and Kalimantan 0.21. His estimates for dry land rice supply response are 
generally about 50 per cent larger than the above estimates. For example, the long run 
estimate for dry land rice supply response for Java is 0.21 and for Sulawesi it is above 
2.   
In summary, the available econometric evidence, while thin, supports the view 
that in Indonesia the overall elasticity of supply response of rice is low, but not zero. 
The estimates are higher in the long run than the short run, higher in dry land 
conditions than wet land conditions and generally higher off-Java than on-Java. 
Estimates of the long run elasticity of output with respect to price in the range of 0.2 
to 0.4 would be consistent with the available evidence. Nevertheless, it must be 
recognized that considerable uncertainty remains as to the true value of this key 
parameter. 
 
The optimal tariff argument 
In the case of Indonesia’s rice imports there is a possible further case for 
protection which rests on economic efficiency alone – known as the ‘optimal tariff 
argument’. Strangely, the current debate on rice protection has largely ignored this 
argument, even though its potential implications are significant. Indonesia is a large 
importer of rice relative to the world market and seemingly possesses a degree of 
monopsony power. Because the international price is affected by the volume of 
Indonesian imports, the marginal cost of Indonesia’s imports exceeds the world price. 
In these circumstances, starting from a position of zero protection, it is possible to 
raise national income by restricting imports. The gains in national income are 
achieved through an improvement in the terms of trade – protection induces a 
reduction in the price of rice imports relative to export prices in general by reducing 
the volume of imports. In a famous contribution, Harry Johnson demonstrated that if 
the elasticity of supply of imports to a country is ε, then the rate of tariff which 
maximizes national income is 1/ε (Corden 1974). For example, if the elasticity of 
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world supply was 5, the optimal tariff (or tariff equivalent restriction of imports) 
would be 20 per cent.  
How important could the optimal tariff argument be in the case of Indonesia’s 
rice imports? Econometric estimates of the supply of imported rice to Indonesia have 
apparently not been undertaken, but a closely related question has been studied in 
depth. This is the elasticity of demand for rice on the world market for the world’s 
largest exporter, Thailand. The direct connection between these two matters arises as 
follows. Suppose first that Thailand exported one million tons additional rice onto the 
world market. The world price would fall, somewhat.  Now suppose that Indonesia 
imported one million tons less rice from the world market. Again, the world price 
would fall, by an amount virtually identical to that resulting from the increase in 
Thailand’s exports. Indeed, because Indonesia’s rice imports come primarily from 
Thailand, the types of rice involved are essentially the same. 
Studies of the elasticity of demand for Thailand’s rice exports have produced 
estimates ranging from -2.5 to -5.7  If the volume of Indonesia’s imports was the same 
as the volume of Thailand’s exports, the elasticity of supply of rice imports to 
Indonesia would be the same as this but with the opposite sign. Over the three years 
1998 to 2000, Indonesia’s rice imports were about 70 per cent of the level of 
Thailand’s rice exports, implying elasticities of supply of between 3.6 and 7.2. These 
elasticities imply optimal tariffs of 28 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively.   
The central problem with this analysis, however, and with the econometric 
studies on which it are based, is that the estimated elasticities almost certainly 
understate the true long run elasticities of world supply. If the world price were to rise 
permanently, say because a major importer like Indonesia restricted its imports, 
relative to the level they would otherwise have taken, new suppliers would almost 
certainly enter the world market. But because these suppliers are not exporters at 
current world prices, their supply response behavior is not reflected in available 
statistical data. This means that the optimal tariffs which can be estimated from 
arguments like those above are almost certainly upper bounds on the reasonable 
values that an optimal tariff could take.  
It would seem likely that a reasonable estimate of the long run elasticity of 
supply of rice imports to Indonesia would be between 7 and 10 and therefore that 
                                                          
7 This literature is reviewed in detail in Warr (2001). 
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tariffs in the neighborhood of 10 to 14 per cent would be the largest that could be 
justified through the optimal tariff argument. Nevertheless, the true value of the long 
run elasticity of supply of rice imports to Indonesia must be considered uncertain. 
The ‘optimal’ levels of protection discussed above relate to the maximization of 
national income and ignore distributional effects. Of course, such protection would 
also have distributional consequences, which would need to be considered in 
determining its appropriate level. The analysis presented in this paper shows how this 
can be done. 
 
The case for a general equilibrium treatment 
An adequate analysis of the distributional effects of rice import restrictions 
needs to take account of its effects on households’ expenditures, disaggregated by 
household group, but also its effects on their incomes. This requires taking account of 
its effects on the labour market as well as the returns to land. In doing this, the rice 
industry could not be considered in isolation. An increase in unskilled wages would 
affect profitability in other industries, with effects on outputs and prices in those 
industries as well. These effects would have repercussions on household incomes. 
These effects would then have to be balanced against the effects on consumers of an 
increase in the price of rice. But the consumption of rice could not be considered in 
isolation either. An increase in the price of rice would have implications for the 
demand for other staple foods, such as those based on corn and wheat flour, another 
significant import.  
For analyzing the distributional effects of trade policy, a general equilibrium 
treatment is essential. The debate over Indonesia’s rice protection illustrates this 
point. The economic issues involved are complex and interrelated. A framework is 
required which accounts for these interactions and which simultaneously satisfies all 
relevant market clearing conditions and macroeconomic constraints. To address 
issues of poverty and inequality, such a framework must include a disaggregated 
household sector.  Moreover, as the above discussion has shown, the full effects of 
rice protection depend on the values of key economic parameters, including the 
supply response of domestic producers and the elasticity of the world’s supply of rice 
imports to Indonesia; but the true values of these parameters are uncertain. A 
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framework is therefore needed in which the values of key parameters can be varied to 
determine the sensitivity of the results to the assumed values of these parameters.   
The following section describes the Wayang general equilibrium model of the 
Indonesian economy.  The next section applies this model to the analysis of the 
distributional effects of a restriction of rice imports, in particular its effects on 
poverty incidence. The analysis employs considerable sensitivity analysis around the 
assumed values of key parameters. The final section concludes.  
 
2. The Wayang General Equilibrium Model 
This study uses the Wayang general equilibrium model of the Indonesian economy 
(Warr et al. 1998; Wittwer 1999; Warr and Wittwer 2005). It is based on the 
Indonesian Input-Output Table for 2000, the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 
2000, and the 19099 Susenas household income and expenditure survey, all published 
by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics. The SAM identifies ten different types 
of households, representing ten socio-economic groups. In the present study, each of 
these 10 SAM household categories is divided into 100 sub-categories of equal 
population size, with the sub-categories arranged by consumption expenditures per 
capita – that is, centile groups. That is, the model identifies a total of 1,000 household 
categories. The advantage of working with a general equilibrium model with a highly 
disaggregated household sector is that it becomes possible to conduct controlled 
experiments, which focus on the consequences for household incomes, expenditures, 
poverty and inequality that arise from different economic shocks, taken one at a time. 
As well as disaggregating households, Wayang also has a disaggregated 
industry and commodity structure. The microeconomic behaviour assumed within it 
is competitive profit maximisation on the part of all firms and competitive utility 
maximisation on the part of consumers. In the simulations reported in this paper, the 
markets for final outputs, intermediate goods and factors of production are all 
assumed to clear at prices that are determined endogenously within the model.8 The 
nominal exchange rate between the rupiah and the US dollar can be thought of as 
being fixed exogenously. The role within the model of the exogenous nominal 
                                                          
8 Variations to this assumption are possible. For example, the possibility of unemployment can be 
introduced by varying the closure to make either real or nominal wages exogenous, thereby allowing 
the level of employment to be endogenously determined by demand. 
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exchange rate is to determine, along with international prices, the nominal domestic 
price level. Given that prices adjust flexibly to clear markets, a 1 percent increase in 
the rupiah/dollar exchange rate will result in a 1 percent increase in all nominal 
domestic prices, leaving all real variables unchanged.  
Wayang belongs to the class of general equilibrium models which are linear in 
proportional changes, sometimes referred to as Johansen models, after the seminal 
work of Johansen (1964), which also used this approach. It shares many structural 
features with the highly influential ORANI general equilibrium model of the 
Australian economy (Dixon, et al. 1982), which also belongs to this Johansen 
category, but these features have been adapted in light of the realities of the 
Indonesian economy. The principal features of the model are summarized below. 
Industries 
The national model contains 65 producer goods and services produced by 65 
corresponding industries - 18 agricultural industries, 5 ‘resource industries’ (forestry, 
fishing, mining and quarrying) and 47 other industries. Each industry produces a 
single output, so the set of commodities coincides with the set of industries. The 
various industries of the model are classified as either ‘export-oriented’ or ‘import-
competing’. The level of exports of an export-oriented industry is endogenous, while 
the exports of an import-competing industry is exogenous.9  The criterion used to 
classify these industries is the ratio of an industry's imports to its exports. If this ratio 
exceeds 1.5, then the industry is regarded as producing an importable. If the 
import/export ratio is less than 0.5, then the industry is deemed to be export-oriented. 
For ratios between 0.5 and 1.5, additional relevant information is used in classifying 
the industry. 
Commodities 
Wayang contains two types of commodities - producer goods and consumer goods.  
Producer goods have two sources: domestically-produced and imported. All 65 
producer goods are in principle capable of being imported, although some have zero 
levels of imports in the database, services and utilities representing most of the 
examples. The 20 consumer goods identified in the model are each transformed from 
                                                          
9 Given that the exported and domestically sold good are treated as being identical, this assumption is 
necessary to make it possible to separate the domestic price of the import competing good from the 
price of the exported good.  Otherwise, the Armington structure would be redundant. 
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the producer goods, where the proportions of domestically produced and imported 
producer goods of each kind used in this transformation is sensitive to their 
(Armington) elasticities of substitution and to changes in their relative prices. 
Factors of production 
The mobility of factors of production is a critical feature of any general equilibrium 
system.  'Mobility' is used here to mean mobility across economic activities 
(industries), rather than geographical mobility. The greater the factor mobility that is 
built into the model, the greater is the economy's simulated capacity to respond to 
changes in the economic environment. It is clearly essential that assumptions about 
the mobility of factors of production be consistent with the length of run that the 
model is intended to represent. 
Two types of labour are identified: 'unskilled’ and ‘skilled’. They are 
distinguished by the educational characteristics of the workforce: skilled labour is 
defined as those workers with lower secondary education or more. Both types of 
labour are assumed to be fully mobile across all sectors. These assumptions imply 
that skilled wages must be equal in all sectors. The same applies to unskilled wages, 
though skilled and unskilled wages can differ and need not move together. 
There are two kinds of mobile capital - one that is mobile among agricultural 
sectors, and another that is mobile among non-agricultural industries. It is assumed 
that mobile agricultural capital cannot be used outside agriculture and mobile non-
agricultural capital cannot be used in agriculture. In this treatment, agricultural capital 
is thought of as machinery such as tractors of various kinds, which can be used in a 
variety of agricultural activities. Non-agricultural mobile capital is thought of as 
industrial machinery and buildings.   
Constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production technology is assumed for 
each sector, with diminishing returns to scale to variable factors alone. However, we 
introduce a sector specific fixed factor in every sector to assure that there are constant 
returns to scale in production to all factors. We refer to the set of specific factors in 
the agricultural sectors as ‘land’, and to the set of those in the non-agricultural sectors 
as ‘fixed capital’. The assumption of constant returns means that all factor demand 
functions are homogeneous of degree one in output. In each sector, there is a zero 
profit condition, which equates the price of output to the minimum unit cost of 
production. This condition can be thought of determining the price of the fixed factor 
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in that sector. 
 Table 1 compares the cost structure of the paddy industry (farm level 
production of rice) with the rest of the agricultural sector and the rest of the economy. 
Contrary to what might be supposed, the paddy industry is not particularly intensive 
in its use of unskilled labour, which accounts for only 4.3 per cent of total costs and 
5.25 per cent of total variable costs, both well below other agricultural industries and 
the rest of the economy, on average. This point will be important for later discussion. 
Households 
The model contains ten major household categories - seven rural and three urban - 
differentiated by socio-economic group.  The sources of income of each of these 
household types depend on their ownership of factors of production. These differ 
among the household categories and are estimated from the 2000 BPS Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM). The SAM is based primarily on the household income and 
expenditure survey called Susenas. Drawing on the 1999 Susenas data, each of the 10 
household categories is sub-divided into a further 100 sub-categories each of the 
same population size, arranged by real consumption expenditures per capita, giving a 
total of 1,000 sub-categories.10 The consumer demand equations for the various 
household types are based on the linear expenditure system. Within each of the 10 
major categories, the 100 sub-categories differ according to their budget shares in 
consumption. 
Since our focus is on income distribution, the sources of income of the various 
households are of particular interest. The source of the factor ownership matrix used 
in the model is Indonesia’s SAM for the year 2000.  The households are described as 
follows.  
 
1. Agricultural employees- Agricultural workers who do not own land  
 
2. Small farmers - Agricultural workers with land < 0.5 ha  
 
3. Medium farmers - Agricultural workers with land 0.5 ~ 1 ha  
 
4. Large farmers - Agricultural workers with land >1 ha  
 
                                                          
10 The population sizes of the 10 major categories are not the same, but within each of these 10 
categories the population sizes of the 100 sub-categories are the same.  
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5. Rural low income - non-agricultural households, consisting of small retail 
store owners, small entrepreneurs, small personal service providers, and 
clerical and manual workers in rural areas  
 
6. Rural non-labour  households, consisting of non-labour force and 
unclassified households in rural areas  
 
7. Rural high income - non-agricultural households consisting of managers 
technicians, professionals, military officers, teachers, large entrepreneurs, 
large retail store owners, large personal service providers, and skilled 
clerical workers in rural areas  
 
8. Urban low income households, consisting of small retail store owners, small 
entrepreneurs, small personal service providers, and clerical and manual 
workers in urban areas 
 
9. Urban non-labour  households, consisting of non-labour force and 
unclassified househods in urban areas  
 
10. Urban high income households, consisting of managers, technicians, 
professionals, military officers, teachers, large entrepreneurs, large personal 
service providers, and skilled clerical workers in urban areas.  
 
The sources of income of these households are based on the SAM and are 
summarized in Table 2. These household categories vary considerably in the 
composition of their factor incomes, but within the analysis of this paper, the 
composition of factor incomes is assumed to be uniform among the 100 sub-
categories of each of these 10 major categories. Of course, the incomes of these 100 
sub-categories vary considerably, so they should be thought of as owning varying 
quantities of a uniform bundle of factors. The composition of the factor bundle varies 
across the 10 major household categories but is uniform within each.   
 Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of the 10 major household categories 
in so far as they relate to poverty incidence. Poor people are found in all 10 
household categories, at rates varying from roughly 40 percent (Rural 1) to 5 per cent 
(Urban 3). Within each of these household categories consumption expenditures per 
capita vary widely. In the simulations conducted below, poverty incidence is 
calculated for each of the 10 household categories, using poverty lines for each 
category which replicate the levels of poverty incidence calculated from the Susenas 
1999 data set, using official poverty lines.  
 14
Figure 3 illustrates this procedure by showing the cumulative distribution of real 
expenditures for one of the ten household categories, Rural 1. The officially 
calculated level of poverty incidence for this household is 39.815 and the poverty line 
which replicates this level of poverty incidence, using the Susenas data, is shown in 
the diagram. In the simulations, the real values of these poverty lines are held 
constant, using household-specific consumer price indices, based on household-
specific budget shares. Poverty incidence at the ‘rural’, ‘urban’ and ‘total’ levels is 
calculated by aggregating poverty incidence at these 10 household category levels, 
using their respective population shares as weights (see Table 3). This produces an 
estimate of the base level of poverty incidence at the national level of 23.1 per cent. 
The incidence in rural areas (29.1%) is two and a half times that in urban areas 
(12%).  
Inequality is calculated for the rural, urban and total populations by constructing 
a Lorenz curve separately for each, as shown in Figure 4, and then using a 
spreadsheet calculation to estimate the Gini coefficient for each. Figure 4 reveals that 
inequality is higher in urban than rural areas and higher than for the general 
population. 
 
3. The Simulations 
The shock 
The data base of the model was calibrated to reflect a 25 per cent tariff on rice 
imports, as was the case from 2000 to 2003. For analytical convenience it was 
assumed that there was a quantitative restriction in place in this base situation but that 
the restriction was non-binding, with a magnitude of 102 per cent of the actual level of 
imports in this base situation (the year 2000). The shock then applied to this base 
solution was a 90 per cent reduction in the level of this quantitative restriction. This 
reduction makes the quota strongly binding and reduces the actual level of imports by 
89.8 per cent. The reason that imports are not reduced to zero is that although the 
restriction is called a ‘ban’, some imports actually persist. The quota licences are 
assumed to be owned by the household group Urban 3. The quota rent (revenue 
obtained from this implicit tax) is distributed in full to this household category, 
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distributed among its 100 centile sub-categories in proportion to their household 
expenditures per capita. 
The closure 
Since the real consumption expenditure of each household is chosen as the basis 
for welfare measurement, and is the basis for the calculation of poverty incidence, the 
macroeconomic closure must be made compatible with both this measure and the 
single-period horizon of the model. This is done by ensuring that the full economic 
effects of the shocks to be introduced are channeled into current-period household 
consumption and do not 'leak' into other directions, with real-world intertemporal 
welfare implications not captured by the welfare measure. The choice of 
macroeconomic closure may thus be seen in part as a mechanism for minimizing 
inconsistencies between the use of a single-period model to analyze welfare results 
and the multi-period reality that the model represents.   
 To prevent intertemporal and other welfare leakages from occurring, the 
simulations are conducted with balanced trade (exogenous balance on current 
account). This ensures that the potential benefits from, say, reduced imports of 
rice, do not flow to foreigners in the form of a current account surplus, or that 
increases in domestic consumption are not achieved at the expense of borrowing 
from abroad, in the case of a current account deficit.  For the same reason, real 
government spending and real investment demand for each good are each held 
fixed exogenously. The government budget deficit is held fixed in nominal terms. 
This is achieved by endogenous across-the-board adjustments to personal income 
tax rates so as to restore the base level of the budgetary deficit.   
The combined effect of these features of the closure is that the full effects of 
changes in policy are channeled into household consumption and not into effects 
not captured within the single period focus of the model. 
 
4. Results 
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The starting point for the results is Simulation A, the features of which are 
summarized in the first column of Tables 4, 5 and 6. For the purposes of the 
parametric variations performed below, it should be noted that in this core 
simulation: 
♦  The assumed elasticity of supply of rice imports to Indonesia is 10.   
♦  CES technology is assumed in all industries and the assumed elasticities of 
substitution are 0.5 in all industries except paddy (rice production) where the 
value is 0.25.11  
♦  The Armington elasticity of substitution in rice demand (the elasticity of 
substitution in demand between imported and domestically produced rice) is 
6, which implies that imported and domestically produced rice are relatively 
close substitutes. 
Each of these parametric assumptions will subsequently be varied, as 
summarized in Table 4. For the time being it is sufficient to focus on the results 
of Simulation A.  
 
Effects on the market for imported rice 
We begin with the effects that the import restriction has on the market for 
imported rice, summarized in Table 4. The solutions can best be understood by 
performing a set of side calculations. The import price of rice in foreign currency 
(c.i.f.) declines as the volume of imports contracts, but not enough to prevent the 
domestic price – both the producer price and the consumer price – from 
increasing. The increase in the domestic price stimulates rice production and 
reduces consumption.  
The magnitude of the reduction in the foreign currency import price can be 
understood as follows. The rest of the world supplies rice to Indonesia with a 
supply function given by 
                                                          
11 As will be explained below, this lower value of the elasticity of substitution for rice is chosen to be 
consistent with the low values of the elasticities of supply response which have been estimated 
empirically for the Indonesian rice sector. 
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= a(PR*)βQ ,       (1) R
where Q is the quantity of Indonesia’s rice imports,  is the foreign currency 
price of these imports,  is a constant reflecting the units of measurement of 
and  and 
R
R R
PR
*
a
Q P* β  is the elasticity of supply to Indonesia, reflecting both the 
elasticity of supply of exporters to the world market in general and Indonesia’s 
imports as a share of this market. The proportional change approximation to this 
equation is 
  ,       (2) *RR pq β=
where q  and  denote the proportional changes in Q  and , respectively.  R R R R
* = b(Q )
p* P*
 The solutions of interest are the solutions in levels, given by equation 
(1). The solutions to (2) are relevant only if they are good approximations to this, 
but this case is a good example of instances where proportional change 
approximations like (2) are highly inaccurate. The solution algorithm used in this 
paper uses a multi-step procedure to approximate the solutions to levels equations 
like (1).12 The reduction in the c.i.f. import price given in Table 4 is 20.41 per 
cent. To understand this result, consider the inverse of equation (1) 
γ ,       (3)  PR R
γ =1/β and , the inverse supply elasticity.  where b =1/a
 Suppose that initially Q  =  =  = 1. As discussed above, when the 
import restriction is imposed the level of  falls (by construction) by 90 per cent 
of its initial value, to 0.1. When 
R PR
* a
QR
β  = 10 (top section of Table 4), γ =1/β  = 0.1. 
The ex post value of  can be checked by solving equation (1) using a hand 
calculator, giving  = 0.7959. That is, the reduction in  is 1 - 0.7959 = 0.2041. 
The c.i.f. import price falls by 20.41 per cent of its ex ante value, as indicated in 
Table 4.
PR
*
P*R R
                                                          
P*
13  
12 For a technical description of this multi-step algorithm, see Codsi, Pearson and Wilcoxen (1991). 
13 The changes in  indicated in simulations B, C and D summarized in Table 6 can be confirmed in 
the same manner, noting that the values of 
PR
*
γ  in these three cases are 0.4, 0.2 and 0.05, respectively. 
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It is  notable that if the proportional change approximation, equation (2), 
was used to estimate this price response, the result would be highly inaccurate. 
The calculation would be, inverting (2), p*R = γqR  = 0.1×90 = 9. That is, this 
approximation would give an estimate of the percentage change in the c.i.f. price 
of less than half the value obtained by solving the appropriate levels equation, 
given by (1). Large errors of this kind can arise from using proportional change 
approximations when (i) the shocks are large, as in this case, and (ii) the 
underlying equation in levels is highly non-linear, as is the case with (1) and (3). 
From Table 4, the import restriction raises the domestic (landed) price of 
imports by a massive 62.51 per cent. This generates a large quota rent, which is 
equivalent to an increase in the initial tariff, in ad valorem terms, of 104 per cent. 
This result may be interpreted in the following way. The import restriction raises 
the domestic price from 1 to 1.6074 and lowers the import price price, as 
described above, from 1 to 0.7959. Writing PR  for the domestic price of imported 
rice, the proportional tariff equivalent of the quota is then given by , where  t
R R
R R
t
P = P*(1+ t),        (4) 
and thus  
  t = (P /P*)−1
giving  = 1.6074 / 0.7959 – 1 = 1.0396, or 104 per cent. That is, as indicated in 
the final row of Table 4, a 90 per cent effective import quota raises the domestic 
price by an amount equivalent to a 104 per cent tariff, in addition to any tariff that 
was in place before the quota. The ‘seasonal import ban’ is an extremely 
protectionist measure. The solutions for simulations B to N summarized in Table 
4 can be understood in a similar way. 
 
Macroeconomic results 
The macroeconomic results are summarised in Table 5. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the increase in rice production does not induce an increase in real 
unskilled wages. The reason for this result is that while rice production uses large 
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quantities of unskilled labour, according to our education-based definition of this 
category, the paddy industry is not intensive in its use of unskilled labour. This 
point is summarized by the data shown in Table 1 and discussed above. The cost 
share of unskilled labour in the paddy industry is only 4.3%, less than the average 
for all industries (8.5%) and less than the average for other agricultural industries 
(9%). Unskilled labour cost as a share of all variable factor costs (excluding land 
and fixed capital) is far below the economy wide average. When the paddy 
industry expands, large quantities of intermediate goods are demanded, such as 
fertilizer, but small additional numbers of unskilled workers are hired; unskilled 
wages fall, in real terms, rather than rise. This point is particularly relevant for the 
simulated effects on poverty. 
 
Effects on poverty and inequality      
The simulated effects on poverty and inequality are summarised in Table 6. 
The results have the following important features. 
(i) Overall poverty incidence rises. The changes in real consumption 
expenditures are dominated by increased living costs, resulting in a reduction in 
the real expenditures of the poor and an increase in poverty incidence. Poverty 
incidence increases in all household categories, in both rural areas and urban 
areas, but the increase in urban areas (around 0.3%) is smaller than the rural 
increase (around 1%). The central reasons are (i) urban budget shares for rice are 
in general well below rural budget shares, and (ii) the real return to unskilled 
labour declines and urban households receive, on average, a lower share of total 
income from this source. 
(ii) Overall inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) increases very 
slightly.  Inequality increases in both rural and urban areas, but the magnitudes 
are trivial. The increase in rural inequality is a consequence of the increase in the 
return to land, which rises relative to the return to unskilled labour. The increase 
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in urban inequality arises from the decline in real skilled and unskilled wages, 
which raises the return to capital.  
 (iii) Within each of the10 household categories, the sub-category households are 
not affected uniformly.  This is an interesting feature of the results and is illustrated in 
Figure 5, which is smoothed to reduce the ‘noise’ caused by non-uniform changes in 
the expenditure shares of rice as expenditures increase within each household 
category. The curves slope up for each household; the proportional change in real 
consumption increases with the level of real expenditure. Real consumption declines 
in all households with real expenditures in the neighbourhood of the poverty line, 
which is why poverty incidence rises within each household category. However, 
households with high real expenditures in categories Rural 7 and Urban 1 actually gain 
from the import quota. The principle reason for this result is that these richer 
households have smaller shares of rice in total expenditures and are less affected by 
the increase in the consumer price of rice.  
Figure 6 illustrates the way that the change in poverty incidence is calculated for 
each of the 10 household categories. The figure focuses on household Rural 4 and 
magnifies the section of the cumulative distribution that is most relevant for poverty 
incidence. The lower line (horizontal dash legend) shows the ex ante distribution for 
household Rural 4 and the upper line (square legend) shows the ex post distribution 
following Simulation A. Under the assumptions of Simulation A, as a result of the 
quota restriction estimated poverty incidence within this household increases from 
27.8 to 29.7 per cent. 
5. Effects of Varying Key Parameters 
To what extent do the results summarised above depend on the assumed 
values of key parameters assumed in Simulation A? This question is important, 
because the above discussion indicates that considerable uncertainty attaches to 
the true values of several parameters which seem particularly relevant. Variations 
in these parameters will now be discussed. We shall vary, in turn, the elasticity of 
supply of rice imports to Indonesia, the elasticity of supply response of paddy 
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with respect to its price, and the Armington elasticity of substitution in demand 
between domestically produced and imported rice. 
 
The elasticity of supply of rice imports 
Simulation A assumes that imports of rice are available to Indonesia with an 
elasticity of supply of 10. Values of 2.5, 5 and 20 are also considered, and the 
simulated implications are summarised in detail in Tables 5 and 6. The 
implications for poverty incidence at the national, rural and urban levels are 
summarized graphically in Figure 7. Poverty increases in every case, including 
both rural and urban poverty incidence. It is argued above that values of this 
parameter below about 5 are implausible, but even in such cases poverty 
incidence increases.  
Lower values of the supply elasticity of rice imports to Indonesia imply 
larger terms of trade effects for a given level of import restriction, but these terms 
of trade effects are insufficient to prevent increased poverty incidence. The 
reason is that when the elasticity of world supply is low, very large increases in 
the domestic price of imported rice are required to achieve the 90% reduction in 
the quantity of imports. Although the import price is forced down by the reduced 
quantity of imports, from the viewpoint of domestic consumers this price 
reduction is more than compensated by the implicit tax on rice imports. Improved 
terms of trade make possible increased imports of other goods, but this effect is 
dominated by the increased price of rice. 
 
The elasticity of supply response of paddy with respect to its price 
It can be shown that the partial equilibrium elasticity of supply response 
with respect to the price of output is related to the parameters of the model by the 
equation ES = σSV /(SFHP ), where ES  is the familiar partial equilibrium elasticity 
of supply response, σ  is the elasticity of substitution between factors of 
production in the CES production function for paddy, SV  and SF  are the shares of 
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variable and fixed factors, respectively in primary factor cost in paddy production 
(the variable factors are labour and mobile capital; the fixed factors are land and 
fixed capital), and HP  is the share of primary factors (labour, capital and land) in 
total costs in paddy production (the share of all inputs except intermediate, 
material inputs).   
Higher values of σ  imply greater supply response. The parametric 
assumptions underlying Simulation A imply an elasticity of supply response of 
0.31, roughly consistent with the empirically estimated values of this response 
parameter, as reviewed above. It is possible to vary this implied elasticity by 
varying the assumed elasticity of substitution and Simulations E, F, G and H do 
this. The assumed elasticities of substitution of 0.15, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.35 imply 
elasticities of supply response of 0.186, 0.248, 0.372 and 0.434, respectively. 
This would seem to cover the full range of plausible values of this parameter, 
given the available empirical evidence. The results are summarized in Figure 8.  
Poverty incidence increases throughout the range.  
 The elasticity of substitution in paddy production has no bearing on the 
expenditure-side effects that are the dominant source of the increased poverty, 
but it does affect changes in incomes. The larger this elasticity of substitution, the 
greater the supply response and the smaller is the reduction in the real wages of 
unskilled labour, and hence the smaller the increase in poverty incidence. 
Nevertheless, this effect is too small to change the qualitative effect on poverty 
incidence. 
 
The Armington elasticity of substitution in rice demand  
When the Armington elasticity of substitution in demand between imported 
in domestically produced rice is varied, the estimated increases in poverty 
incidence are affected only trivially, as shown in Figure 9. Variations in the 
assumed Armington elasticity do not turn the simulated poverty increase into a 
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reduction in poverty, nor do they turn a ‘moderate’ increase in poverty incidence 
into a ‘large’ one.  
Higher values of this elasticity imply closer substitution between imported 
and domestically produced rice. However, this does not translate into larger 
increases in the price of domestically produced rice, for a given level of quota 
restriction, as it would with a fixed ad valorem tariff, but rather smaller increases 
in the landed price of imported rice. This feature of the results is shown clearly 
by Table 4 (see the columns for Simulations I to N). Imports are a small share of 
domestic consumption. Greater substitutability between imports and domestic 
rice reduces the rents obtainable from the quota on imported rice. The increase in 
the consumer price of rice, including both imported and domestically produced 
rice, actually declines as the Armington elasticity is increased and the estimated 
increase in poverty incidence is correspondingly slightly smaller.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The analysis presented in this paper indicates that a 90 per cent effective ban on 
Indonesia’s rice imports increases poverty incidence in that country by a little under 1 
per cent of the population. This result is based on a general equilibrium analysis 
which disaggregates households in considerable detail and which varies the assumed 
values of key parameters across the seemingly plausible range. For all plausible 
parametric assumptions which were considered, poverty incidence increases as a 
result of the import restriction. The increase in poverty incidence is moderate but 
significant, and occurs in both rural and urban areas. It is not possible to justify the 
import ban by claiming that it reduces poverty. 
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Table 1 Cost shares of major factors of production: paddy and other industries          
 
(per cent of industry’s total costs) 
 
Cost components Paddy 
Other 
agriculture 
Non 
agriculture 
All 
Industries 
Unskilled labour 4.3 9.0 8.7 8.5 
Skilled labour 3.1 6.6 9.8 9.3 
Mobile agricultural capital 20.6 21.3 - 2.3 
Mobile non-agricultural capital - - 20.5 18.2 
Land 18.1 20.2 - 2.1 
Non-land fixed capital - - 11.7 10.5 
Intermediate inputs 53.9 42.9 49.3 49.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Data base of Wayang model, based on Indonesian Input-Output Table, 2000, and Social 
Accounting Matrix,2000, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jakarta, 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  Sources of factor incomes of the broad household groups 
 
(per cent of household income) 
 
 
 Land 
Skilled 
Labour 
Unskilled 
Labour 
Agri var 
capital 
Non-agri 
var 
capital Fixed cap Total 
Rural 1 4.06 1.37 53.62 2.12 9.33 29.50 100 
Rural 2 1.58 6.13 26.74 1.38 16.31 47.87 100 
Rural 3 9.77 2.71 14.06 4.83 16.05 52.58 100 
Rural 4 9.71 3.96 7.76 4.86 17.37 56.33 100 
Rural 5 7.55 6.99 43.27 3.57 8.68 29.95 100 
Rural 6 2.77 29.18 15.19 1.73 12.74 38.40 100 
Rural 7 12.58 20.69 4.47 5.86 12.41 44.00 100 
Urban 1 4.13 12.82 24.39 2.35 13.84 42.47 100 
Urban 2 3.22 21.97 42.28 1.69 7.42 23.43 100 
Urban 3 4.09 23.78 1.33 2.47 16.95 51.38 100 
 
 
Source: Data base of Wayang model, based on Indonesian Social Accounting Matrix and Susenas 
survey, 1999, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jakarta, 
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Table 3 Expenditure and poverty incidence by household group 
Household 
group: 
% of total 
population 
in this group 
Mean per 
capita 
expenditure 
(Rp. /mo.) 
% of this 
group in 
poverty 
% of all poor 
people in this 
group 
Rural 1 8.0 6,358 39.8 13.9 
Rural 2 14.8 3,608 34.9 22.4 
Rural 3 7.1 7,584 32.3 9.9 
Rural 4 9.0 6,618 27.8 10.9 
Rural 5 16.0 3,891 23.8 16.5 
Rural 6 4.9 12,795 28.0 5.9 
Rural 7 5.0 16,060 10.5 2.3 
Urban 1 20.4 4,210 15.2 13.4 
Urban 2 6.1 17,813 11.2 2.9 
Urban 3 8.7 14,353 5.0 1.9 
     
Indonesia 100 12,084 23.1 100 
     
Memo items:  
Headcount poverty incidence national (%) 23.076 
Headcount poverty incidence rural (%) 29.086 
Headcount poverty incidence urban (%) 11.980 
Gini coefficient national 0.26646 
Gini coefficient rural 0.23676 
Gini coefficient urban 0.30491 
 
Source: Data base of Wayang model, based on Indonesian Social Accounting Matrix and Susenas 
survey, 1999, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jakarta, 
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 Table 4 Summary of parametric assumptions and simulated effects on the rice 
market of a 90% effective rice import ban 
 
Simulation A B C D E F G 
    Parametric assumptions   
Elasticity of supply of imported 
rice 10 2.5 5 20 10 10 10 
Elasticity of substitution in paddy 
prod. 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.15 0.20 0.30 
Armington elasticity in rice 
demand 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
      Effects on rice market – per cent change unless specified  
Quantity of imports -90 -90 -90 -90 -90 -90 -90 
Import price of rice, c.i..f.,  ($US) -20.41 -59.87 -36.65 -10.79 -20.41 -20.41 -20.41
Domestic price of imports (Rp.) 62.51 62.54 62.52 62.50 65.06 63.56 61.73 
Producer price of milled rice (Rp.) 7.82 7.84 7.83 7.82 9.86 8.66 7.20 
Producer price of paddy (Rp.) 9.23 9.25 9.24 9.22 11.75 10.27 8.46 
Production of milled rice 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.55 2.17 2.42 2.73 
Production of paddy 2.55 2.56 2.55 2.55 2.14 2.38 2.68 
Tariff equivalent of quota (%) 104 305 157 82 107 106 103 
        
 
Source: Author's computations 
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Table 4 (Continued) Summary of parametric assumptions and simulated effects 
on the rice market of a 90% effective rice import ban 
 
Simulation H I J K L M N 
    Parametric assumptions   
Elasticity of supply of imported 
rice 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Elasticity of substitution in paddy 
prod. 0.35 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Armington elasticity in rice 
demand 6 2 4 8 10 25 100 
      Effects on rice market – per cent change unless specified  
Quantity of imports -90 -90 -90 -90 -90 -90 -90 
Import price of rice, c.i..f.,  ($US) -20.41 -20.41 -20.41 -20.41 -20.41 -20.41 -20.41
Domestic price of imports (Rp.) 61.13 268.36 98.46 47.26 38.81 19.86 10.15 
Producer price of milled rice (Rp.) 6.72 9.30 8.15 7.67 7.58 7.36 7.24 
Producer price of paddy (Rp.) 7.87 10.98 9.61 9.05 8.94 8.68 8.54 
Production of milled rice 2.78 3.06 2.70 2.55 2.52 2.45 2.41 
Production of paddy 2.83 3.01 2.65 2.50 2.48 2.41 2.37 
Tariff equivalent of quota (%) 102 363 149 85 74 51 38 
        
 
Source: Author's computations. 
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 Table 5 Simulated Macroeconomic Effects of a 90% Rice Import Ban: 
Varying elasticity of supply of imported rice  
 
(per cent change) 
 Simulation:  A B C D 
 Parameter varied:  Import supply elasticity 10 2.5 5 20 
       
Overall economy       
 Gross Domestic Product      
  Nominal (local currency) 0.361 0.445 0.437 0.427 
  Real  -0.076 -0.103 -0.084 -0.067 
 Consumer Price Index  0.651 0.657 0.654 0.649 
 GDP Deflator  0.510 0.548 0.521 0.495 
 Wage (nominal) Skilled  0.115 0.122 0.118 0.112 
  Unskilled  0.192 0.200 0.195 0.189 
 Wage (real) Skilled  -0.536 -0.535 -0.536 -0.537 
  Unskilled  -0.459 -0.457 -0.458 -0.460 
 External sector (foreign currency)      
 Export Revenue    -0.212 -0.219 -0.214 -0.207 
 Import Bill   -0.136 -0.126 -0.133 -0.142 
Government budget (local currency)      
  Revenue (local currency) Total revenue  0.575 0.587 0.580 0.570 
  Tariff revenue  0.220 0.230 0.224 0.216 
 Expenditure Nominal (local currency) 0.485 0.494 0.488 0.480 
  Real  -0.167 -0.164 -0.166 -0.169 
 Household sector       
 Consumption Nominal  (local currency) 0.380 0.398 0.388 0.375 
  Real  -0.267 -0.258 -0.264 -0.272 
 
Source: Author's computations. 
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Table 6 Simulated Distributional Effects of a 90% Rice Import Ban: 
Varying rice import supply elasticity 
 
(per cent change, except poverty incidence and Gini coefficient) 
 Simulation:  A B C D 
 Parameter varied:  Import supply elasticity 10 2.5 5 20 
 
Real consumption expenditures, deflated by household-specific CPI (% change) 
 Rural rural1  -0.608 -0.652 -0.607 -0.609 
  rural2  -0.539 -0.593 -0.538 -0.540 
  rural3  -0.906 -0.944 -0.905 -0.907 
  rural4  -0.910 -0.949 -0.909 -0.911 
  rural5  -0.354 -0.418 -0.353 -0.355 
  rural6  -0.666 -0.712 -0.665 -0.667 
  rural7  -0.072 -0.014 0.075 0.071 
 Urban urban1  -0.020 -0.099 -0.019 -0.022 
  urban2  -0.319 -0.389 -0.318 -0.321 
  urban3  0.190 -0.708 0.203 0.168 
 
Poverty Incidence  
(% population concerned)  Ex-ante Simulated outcomes 
 Rural households rural1 39.815 40.475 40.518 40.475 40.477 
  rural2 34.890 35.358 35.396 35.358 35.360 
  rural3 32.294 32.994 33.232 32.994 32.995 
  rural4 27.821 29.733 29.767 29.733 29.734 
  rural5 23.779 25.244 25.306 25.243 25.246 
  rural6 28.009 28.665 28.699 28.665 28.665 
  rural7 10.501 10.573 10.655 10.572 10.575 
 Urban households urban1 15.216 15.684 15.781 15.683 15.687 
  urban2 11.162 11.325 11.342 11.325 11.326 
  urban3 4.998 5.020 5.221 5.018 5.025 
               Rural population  29.086 30.032 30.103 30.033 30.035 
               Urban population  11.980 12.284 12.394 12.284 12.288 
               Total population  23.076 23.795 23.881 23.798 23.800 
 
Gini coefficient of inequality 
(index)  Ex-ante Simulated outcomes 
               Rural population   0.23676 0.23754 0.23752 0.23754 0.23754 
              Urban population   0.30491 0.30581 0.30572 0.30581 0.30580 
              Total population   0.26646 0.26737 0.26726 0.26737 0.26737 
 
Source: Author's computations. 
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 Figure 1 Real price of rice, Indonesia, 1969 to 2003 
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Source: Bulog (rice prices) and Central Bureau of Statistics, Jakarta (CPI). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 World price and domestic price of rice, Indonesia, 1985 to 2004 
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Note: “World price” means c.i.f. import price of milled rice in $US converted to Rupiah in current 
prices using market exchange rate. “Domestic price” means market price in Jakarta of milled rice in 
Rupiah, current prices.    
Source: Bulog (rice prices) and Central Bureau of Statistics, Jakarta. (exchange rates). 
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Figure 3 The cumulative distribution of real consumption expenditures per 
capita - SAM household category Rural 1, 1999 
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Source: Author’s calculations, based on Susenas 1999, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jakarta. 
 
 
Figure 4 Lorenz curves of the ex ante distribution of real expenditures per 
capita, rural population, urban population and total population, 1999 
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Source: Author’s calculations, based on Susenas 1999, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jakarta. 
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Figure 5 Simulation A: Changes in real consumption by household category 
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Source: Author’s calculations.  
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Figure 6 Estimated cumulative distribution of real consumption expenditures:  
– Household Rural 4, before and after Simulation A 
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Note: The bottom line (horizontal dash legend) corresponds to the ex-ante distribution (poverty 
incidence  = 27.821) and the top line (square legend) corresponds to the ex-post distribution resulting 
from Simulation A (poverty incidence  = 27.821). 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
Figure 7 Simulated changes in poverty incidence: 
 Varying elasticity of world supply of imported rice 
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Source: Author’s calculations.  
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Figure 8 Simulated changes in poverty incidence: 
Varying elasticity of substitution in rice production  
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Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Simulated changes in poverty incidence: 
 Varying Armington elasticity of substitution in rice demand 
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Source: Author’s calculations.  
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